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I.  INTRODUCTION 
We can never know for certain who bludgeoned Marilyn Sheppard to death early 
in the morning of July 4, 1954.  We weren’t there.  But in his recent book, The 
Wrong Man, journalist James Neff argues convincingly that the most likely killer 
was Richard Eberling, a sociopath who killed other women after stealing from them 
over the course of a long criminal career.2 Eberling was convicted for one of these 
killings, but Neff makes a strong case that there were other victims as well, including 
Marilyn Sheppard. At the time of Mrs. Sheppard’s death, Eberling had worked for 
the Sheppards as a window cleaner.  The evidence against him includes some DNA 
evidence, which was probative but not entirely conclusive, a reported confession, 
opportunity, conduct consistent with other crimes he was known to have committed 
and with Dr. Sheppard’s story of what happened the night his wife was murdered, 
and a series of Eberling’s statements tying him to the crime scene, made both before 
and during his incarceration for killing another woman.  Some of these statements 
were made to Neff, who had been interviewing Eberling in prison, where Eberling 
died in 1998. 
Let us assume that Neff is right.  If so, the most important question is what went 
wrong with the system of justice that led to Dr. Sheppard’s conviction for his wife’s 
murder in 1954.  The question is serious enough if only because of the tragedy that 
                                                                
1Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.  I am grateful to George Carr, Patricia Falk and 
Adam Thurschwell for their generous help with difficult issues of Ohio law and for their 
sharing legal materials.  
2JAMES NEFF, THE WRONG MAN: THE FINAL VERDICT ON THE DR. SAM SHEPPARD MURDER 
CASE  (2001). 
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001
466 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:465 
the legal process wreaked on Dr. Sheppard and his family.  But it becomes all the 
more serious if the answer includes dysfunction in the legal system that has not been 
corrected in the half century since the first Sheppard trial.  Moreover, F. Lee Bailey’s 
successful efforts in the 1960’s to free Dr. Sheppard on a writ of habeas corpus, and 
the subsequent retrial resulting in a verdict of not guilty were not the last legal 
proceedings.  In 1999, Dr. Sheppard’s son, Sam Reese Sheppard, brought a civil 
action based on wrongful conviction to clear his father’s name affirmatively.  He 
lost, the jury finding that he had not met the requisite burden of proving his father’s 
innocence.   
Indeed, it is difficult to prove one’s innocence, and the legal system purports not 
to require defendants in criminal cases to do so.  Defendants are supposed to have no 
burden of proof, and the government’s burden is supposed to be an exacting one: 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  I will argue that the system does not always 
function according to this design, and certainly did not do so in the first Sheppard 
trial.  Rather, it functioned more like the civil trial, in which the Sheppards, as 
plaintiffs, had  the obligation to prove their case.  The shift in the burden of proof 
happened for a number of reasons.  Some are still very much a part of the system 
today, and are not specific to any peculiarities in the Sheppard case itself. 
The conviction of the innocent has become a frequent topic of discussion in 
recent years, largely because post-conviction DNA analysis has made the 
phenomenon impossible to deny with any credibility.  Barry Scheck, Peter Neufeld 
and Jim Dwyer3 devote most of their book, Actual Innocence, to describing the 
investigative work and legal struggles that led to the exoneration through DNA 
evidence of a number of people wrongly convicted of crimes they did not commit.  
As recent events have shown, DNA analysis, had it been available in 1954, would 
have at least cast enough additional doubt on Dr. Sam Sheppard’s guilt to make it 
less likely that he would ever have been brought to trial.4 
But Actual Innocence raises another question – a question that DNA evidence 
cannot answer: What happens at a trial that leads a jury to vote unanimously that an 
innocent person is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of committing a crime that he 
did not commit?   In an appendix, Scheck et al. list a number of recurring factors, 
including, in order of prevalence, mistaken eyewitness identification, incorrect 
serology inclusion, police misconduct, prosecutorial misconduct, defective or 
fraudulent science, bad lawyering and false testimony.5 
Many of these factors, along with others, were present in both the first and third 
Sheppard trials.  Most horrifying was the willingness of government lawyers and 
witnesses to engage in misconduct.  For example, the key prosecution witness in the 
1954 trial was the county coroner, Dr. Samuel Gerber.  Dr. Sheppard claimed that 
the killer had struck him and knocked him unconscious twice – once in the bedroom 
where his wife had been killed, and again outside, on the shore of Lake Erie, where 
Dr. Sheppard had followed the killer out the back of the lake-front home.  When he 
returned to the house, he called his neighbor, the mayor of Bay Village, the 
                                                                
3BARRY SCHECK, ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE (2000). 
4For discussion of this evidence, see NEFF, supra note 2, at 329-32. 
5SCHECK, supra note 3, at 263.  For further discussion of some of the problems with expert 
identification techniques, see Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law’s 
Formative Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L. J. 1069 (1998). 
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Cleveland suburb in which they lived.  Dr. Gerber testified persuasively that Dr. 
Sheppard’s story was incredible because of the considerable time that elapsed 
between the time of death, established by the coroner’s office, and the time that Dr. 
Sheppard called the mayor.  What Dr. Gerber did not say at trial is that his own 
office had established the time of death as much earlier, in a report that did not see 
the light of day for some half century.6 The  time of death in the report actually 
supported Dr. Sheppard’s version of the events.   
This omission was one of many false and misleading statements made by 
government officials.  The most famous was Dr. Gerber’s claim that Mrs. Sheppard 
was likely killed with some kind of surgical instrument.7 At the first trial, he was 
never asked why he could not produce an instrument that matched the impressions 
on the body and the bed sheets.  In reality, the government had searched far and wide 
for such an instrument, but couldn’t find one, a fact that government lawyers and 
witnesses kept to themselves.  All of this came out, rather sensationally, at the 
second trial, in which Bailey obtained the acquittal.8 By the time of the third trial, 
just a few years ago, government lawyers abandoned the surgical instrument theory, 
opting instead for the theory that Dr. Sheppard had killed his wife with a lamp, a 
position that had been abandoned in 1954 as inconsistent with credible evidence.9 
Prosecutorial misconduct was not the only problem with the Sheppard trials.  
Juror exposure to wild theories in the press was not controlled at the first trial.10 In 
fact, the identity of the jurors was a matter of public information, making it more 
difficult for anyone to acquit given the public outrage against Dr. Sheppard that the 
local press had stirred up.  This became the basis for Bailey’s successful habeas 
corpus petition.11  According to Neff, strategic errors by defense counsel may also 
have played a role both in Dr. Sheppard’s conviction and in the recent civil case.  
Moreover, it appears that the jury did not understand the DNA evidence that was 
brought to light in the civil trial. 
In this article, I will discuss another factor that I believe pervades the criminal 
justice system: jury instructions that shift the burden from the government to the 
defendant.  Of course, I cannot prove with certainty that these jury instructions were 
                                                                
6NEFF, supra note 2, at 18. 
7See, e.g., PAUL HOLMES, THE SHEPPARD MURDER CASE 112-13 (1961); NEFF, supra note 
2, at 142. 
8For description, see NEFF, supra note 2, at 261. 
9Id. at 370. 
10I experienced this first-hand on my way to the symposium for which this article was 
prepared.  In a taxi from the airport to my hotel in Cleveland, I mentioned to the driver that I 
was going to be speaking about the Sheppard case.  He told me he believed that Dr. Sheppard 
killed his wife because, being sterile, Dr. Sheppard could not have been the father of the child 
she was carrying.  The driver told me that he had heard this from his parents, but didn’t know 
where they got this information.  In fact, this was one of the rumors that was being circulated 
during the first trial, based on a theory that the government pursued, but had to abandon.  It 
had no basis in fact, it turns out.  Dr. Sheppard’s second wife became pregnant many years 
later in a pregnancy that resulted in a miscarriage, and there was no controversy over who the 
father was. 
11Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). 
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responsible for a particular conviction in a particular case.  The only way to do that 
would be to re-try a large number of cases in precisely the same way as the original 
trial, except for using a corrected instruction, and then to observe a significantly 
lower rate of conviction.  Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the jury in the first 
Sheppard trial took five days and eighteen written ballots to reach a decision. The 
vote on the first ballot was 7 - 5 in favor of conviction.12  In these circumstances, it is 
not unreasonable to ask whether adjustments in the way the jury was told to do its 
job might have affected the outcome. 
Moreover, there now exists a great deal of empirical research that sheds some 
light on the effects that the language of jury instructions are likely to have on 
decision makers.  That research is very robust and, to the best of my knowledge, 
uncontroverted.   It shows that some language routinely used in jury instructions is 
hard to understand, and that the way in which instructions are worded, particularly 
instructions that define the burden of proof, affects the likelihood of conviction, 
especially in close cases.   
Part II of this article establishes three criteria for good criminal jury instructions.  
They are fidelity to the law, comprehensibility, and consistency with the presumption 
of innocence.  It then discusses the presumption of innocence, burden of proof and 
circumstantial evidence instructions used at the time of the first Sheppard trial in 
light of those criteria.  None of them passes muster.  While jury instructions in Ohio 
and elsewhere have made some progress since then, the system can still be improved 
in ways that are quite obvious.  Part III discusses some of the empirical research on 
burden of proof instructions, and relates it to both the jury instructions on which Dr. 
Sheppard was convicted, and contemporary instructions.  Part IV is a brief 
conclusion calling for the criminal justice system to take seriously the need to revise 
jury instructions to convey the messages they are supposed to convey in language 
that people can understand.  It has been almost fifty years since Dr. Sheppard was 
convicted.  The system has made some progress in that time, but not nearly enough. 
II.  JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN THE SHEPPARD TRIAL 
A. Three Criteria for a Good Jury Instruction 
In order to assess the quality of a jury instruction, it is first necessary to decide 
what makes a good jury instruction good.  Let us say that at a minimum any good 
criminal jury instruction must meet the following three criteria: First, it must 
accurately convey the law to the jury.  Second, it must do so comprehensibly.  Third, 
it must not contain subliminal messages that undermine the presumption of 
innocence. 
Writing jury instructions that are legally accurate seems straightforward enough, 
especially when the law is contained in a statute.  In fact, the instructions in the 
Sheppard trial were largely descriptions of the elements of first degree murder, 
second degree murder and manslaughter.13  They summarize the statutes, and explain 
the terms, as do most jury instructions based on statutes.  But fidelity to the law is 
not always easy to achieve, and sometimes comes with some cost.  First, it is 
                                                                
12NEFF, supra note 2, at 165. 
13State v. Sheppard, Transcript, pp. 6996-7003 (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Transcript].  My gratitude to George Carr for providing the transcript of the jury instructions.  
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sometimes possible to be loyal to the language of a complicated statute only by 
making the instruction as incomprehensible as the statute.  This obviously makes the 
trial process a matter of gambling with someone else’s freedom, since the jurors will 
not know what they are supposed to consider when they deliberate.  When a statute 
is complex, the easiest way to be accurate in describing its requirements is to read it 
verbatim to the jury.  But the statute was not written to be easy for people on jury 
duty to understand.  It was written to reflect the precise, and sometimes minute 
compromises that the legislature reached in enacting the law.  The result is a choice 
between guaranteeing fidelity to the statute’s language on the one hand, and making 
the statute understandable, on the other.  Matters become even worse when the 
statute is not only complicated, but is also poorly written.  
There has been a great deal of discussion of the tension between accuracy and 
comprehensibility  in recent literature, focusing largely on death penalty instructions.  
Many death penalty statutes require jurors to take into account both aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances.  However, studies show that jurors usually do not know 
what those terms mean, and instructions on how to weigh them are routinely 
misunderstood.14   Even in this context, courts are often perfectly content to accept 
instructions that track the language of the statute.  As the Eight Circuit held, “[t]he 
best way to comply with [the Federal Death Penalty Act] is to actually use the 
language of the statute  in the jury.”15  This perspective is by no means unusual 
among appellate courts.16 Statutory language can offer a safe harbor for trial courts 
concerned about being reversed even when it is not comprehensible. 
Although many courts accept “accuracy” over comprehensibility, some do set 
higher standards.  Notably, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has made the following 
statement: 
This Court has made abundantly clear that correct jury instructions are 
at the heart of the proper execution of the jury function in a criminal trial: 
“‘[a]ppropriate and proper charges to a jury are essential for a fair trial.’” 
A court’s obligation properly to instruct and to guide a jury includes the 
duty to clarify statutory language that prescribes the elements of a crime 
when clarification is essential to ensure that the jury will fully understand 
and actually find those elements in determining the defendant’s guilt. 
For the purpose of instructing and guiding juries, courts regularly 
explain and define statutory language consistent with legislative intent. 
Courts commonly clarify statutory language to give more precise meaning 
                                                                
14Peter Meijes Tiersma, Dictionaries and Death: Do Capital Jurors Understand 
Mitigation?, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1 (1995); Peter Maijes Tiermsa, Reforming the Language of 
Jury Instructions,, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 37 (1993);    Shari Seidman Diamond & Judith N. 
Levi, Improving Decisions on Death by Revising and Testing Jury Instructions, 79 
JUDICATURE 224, 230-31 (1996). 
15United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 997 (8th Cir. 2000). 
16See Harjo v. Gibson, 216 F.3d 1087 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Instructing  the jury according to 
the  statutory language of the aggravator, as the trial court did, meets constitutional 
standards.”); Farrington v. Senowski,  214 F.3d 237,244 (2d Cir. 2000) (“These  instructions 
on larceny mirror the  statutory language, see N.Y. Penal Law § 155.05, and were therefore 
not ‘clearly constitutionally deficient.’”). 
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to statutory terms to effect the legislative intent and to make sure that 
juries carry out that intent in determining criminal culpability.17 
This approach, in my opinion, is far more likely to lead to fair jury deliberation than 
the mechanical adherence to statutory language without regard to how likely jurors 
are to understand it.  Yet the New Jersey approach is the more unusual one, at least 
as reflected in appellate court decisions.  The result is that trial judges who know that 
the linguistically faithful instruction will be nothing more than gibberish to the jury 
are likely to accept it nonetheless, seeing reversal down the road if they attempt to 
exercise creativity for the sake of comprehensibility.18 
A second issue concerning the accuracy of a jury instruction involves instructions 
that describe such things as burden of proof, causation, and various legal 
presumptions.  For these concepts, the relevant underlying law is about the 
instructions themselves.  We cannot measure their accuracy against a statute defining 
a crime.  Instead, we must measure these instructions against what it is that the 
instruction is supposed to accomplish, and for that we need to agree in advance on a 
theory.  Unless there is consensus about the underlying purpose of the instruction, 
there will be no consensus about what information the instruction is supposed to 
convey.  The wide range of instructions on both causation and burden of proof 
should itself suggest that more than two hundred years into this country’s history, we 
still have not reached consensus on what those theories should be.  As we will see, 
burden of proof instructions, especially instructions defining proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, tend to suffer from lacking a clear sense of exactly what message 
they are attempting to convey.  The reasonable doubt instruction in the 1954 and 
1966 Sheppard trials was a classic example of this phenomenon.  Since then, the 
Ohio legislature has revised the instruction, but it is still not adequately focused on 
what the government must prove.19 
As for the second criterion, comprehensibility, I mean writing or speaking in 
English that is clear enough for jurors to understand.  Both the vocabulary and the 
syntax should make an instruction as easy as possible to comprehend, even if the 
concepts being conveyed are complex. There is a great deal of literature on the issue 
of comprehensible jury instructions.20  As we will see, the presumption of innocence 
instruction used in the Sheppard trials is a model for how not to write an instruction. 
The reasonable doubt instruction failed this test as well.  Also poorly written was the 
instruction on circumstantial evidence.  At the time, Ohio had a rule that when a case 
was based solely on circumstantial evidence, the jury could only convict if there was 
                                                                
17State v. Alexander, 136 N.J. 563, 571-72 (1994). 
18See Peter Tiersma, The Rocky Road to Legal Reform: Improving the Language of Jury 
Instructions, 66 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1081 (2001). 
19See infra Part IIB for discussion. 
20For an early study see Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language 
Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306 
(1979).  See also, Amiram Elwork, Bruce D. Sales, & James J. Alfini, MAKING JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE (1982).  See Tiersma, supra note 18 for additional 
references. 
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no reasonable theory of the evidence consistent with the defendant’s innocence.21  
The instruction that the first Sheppard jury heard on this issue was self-contradictory. 
Finally, jury instructions should not contain messages that will tend to undermine 
the presumption of innocence.  The most egregious example of this tactic that I have 
seen is described in a 1947 New York case, in which the Court of Appeals reversed a 
conviction based on the following definition of reasonable doubt in a jury 
instruction: 
It is not a doubt based upon sympathy or a whim or prejudice or bias or a 
caprice, or a sentimentality, or upon a reluctance of a weak-kneed, timid,  
jellyfish  of a juror who is seeking to avoid the performance of a 
disagreeable duty, namely, to convict another human being of the 
commission of a serious crime.22 
Of course, no court would use such language today, making the quotation appear 
entertaining.  But courts continue to find ways of conveying the message that jurors 
should not be afraid of convicting if they think that the defendant is guilty.  In so 
doing, they continue to undermine the presumption of innocence. 
The circumstantial evidence instructions used in the 1954 trial were strongly 
oriented toward focusing the jury on the circumstantial evidence that favored the 
government and away from the circumstantial evidence that favored Dr. Sheppard.  
As such, they undermined the presumption of innocence.  The reasonable doubt 
instruction also failed in this regard, as do many such instructions even today.23 
Taken together, the failure of the instructions to meet minimal criteria account for 
part of what was unfair about the Sheppard trial.  With the presumption of innocence 
explained in incomprehensible terms, reasonable doubt instructions conveying 
confused messages in unclear language that was largely at odds with the presumption 
of innocence, and examples of circumstantial evidence that favored the prosecution, 
the battle for the defendant was all uphill once the case reached the jury.   
Did the instructions affect the outcome of the case?  We can never know.  But we 
do know from Neff’s recent interviews with surviving jurors that some jurors 
believed Dr. Sheppard was guilty because he was the only one there; others thought 
he was guilty because he was motivated by aspects of his adventurous sex life that 
were disclosed not at trial, but in the press; and others focused on the gap in time 
between the time of death and the time that Dr. Sheppard called the mayor – to 
which the coroner testified in contradiction to his own department’s report, which 
was conveniently suppressed.24  In these circumstances, no one can say that a jury 
focused on its burden and on the presumption of innocence would have acquitted.  
But a hung jury requires only a single vote for acquittal. 
                                                                
21That rule has since been abandoned.  See Ohio v. Jenks, 574 N.E.2d 492, 503 (1991), 
discussed infra note 52. 
22People v. Feldman, 296 N.Y. 127, 140 (1947). 
23See Part III for discussion of how many standard reasonable doubt instructions tend to 
shift the burden of proof from the government to the defendant. 
24NEFF, supra note 2, at 166-67. 
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Let us now examine various jury instructions used in the Sheppard trial to 
determine how well they meet the criteria of accuracy, comprehensibility and 
conformity with the presumption of innocence. 
B.  The Presumption of Innocence 
No principle of criminal law is more deeply embedded in our system than the 
presumption of innocence.  The entire burden of proof in a criminal case rests on the 
shoulders of the government.  It is statutorily mandated in Ohio, but is a matter of 
constitutional right in any event.  The current Ohio statute states in clear and plain 
language: 
Every person accused of an offense is presumed innocent until proven 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the burden of proof for all elements 
of the offense is upon the prosecution.25 
The statutory instruction in place at the time of the Sheppard trial was considerably 
more difficult to understand.26   It read in relevant part: 
A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until he is 
proved guilty of the crime charged, and in case of a reasonable doubt 
whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he shall be acquitted.  This 
presumption of innocence places upon the state the burden of proving him 
guilty beyond reasonable doubt.27 
In addition to these words, the trial judge added the following in the first Sheppard 
trial: 
By presumption of innocence is meant that cloak which the law throws 
over every citizen in our society, giving him, in a sense, a favorable 
position in society as distinguished from an unfavorable one, the place of 
an honest man as distinguished from a dishonest man, and an innocent 
man as distinguished from a law violator, and keeps that cloak over him 
unless and until proof is furnished that such citizen is not entitled to the 
protection of that cloak and, in a case of a charge of crime, to be guilty of 
it by evidence showing it beyond a reasonable doubt, as that term is 
understood under our law.28 
No doubt, what the instruction meant to say was just what the current statute does 
say.  But I find the instruction impossible to understand on its own terms, and I 
cannot imagine that Ohio jurors found it any easier.  One problem is the insertion of 
the phrase, “and in case of a reasonable doubt, whether his guilt is satisfactorily 
                                                                
25OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.05(A) (West 2001).  The statute further shifts the burden 
of proving an affirmative defense to the accused, by a preponderance of the evidence. 
26The instruction, which is statutory, was so poorly written, that I thought the draft paper 
that I was using for my presentation at the conference must have contained typographical 
errors, so I did not make this point there.  When I returned home, I quickly discovered that the 
error was not mine. 
27OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.05. 
28Transcript, supra note 13, at 6995. 
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shown, he shall be acquitted.”  From context, I can guess that the statute was well-
intentioned, and was trying to say that even if proof of guilt seems satisfactory, a jury 
must acquit if it is left with reasonable doubt.  But I can only guess because the 
words of the statute themselves make almost no sense to me.   As for the additional 
language read by Judge Blythen, it consists of a single 110 word sentence with a host 
of messages.  For example, the instruction distinguishes between the “honest” and 
the “dishonest” man with respect to who maintains the “cloak” of innocence.  Does 
that mean that the presumption of innocence automatically disappears if a defendant 
tells a lie?  That is certainly one reasonable interpretation of the instruction, and it is 
inconsistent with the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  
The contrast between the old and new instructions illustrates two important 
points.  First, it is not impossible to take most incomprehensible instructions and to 
make them clear.  The Ohio legislature did an excellent job with the presumption of 
innocence instruction now in effect.  Second, the jury system is fragile.  For years, 
Ohioans on jury duty received no understandable instruction concerning the 
presumption of innocence.  We do not know what presumptions they really had 
when they entered the jury room to deliberate.  The presumption of innocence 
instruction used in the Sheppard trial, then, fails all three tests: It does not accurately 
describe the law, since it is so convoluted we cannot tell what it means.  By the same 
token it is incomprehensible and it undermines the presumption of innocence by 
suggesting that dishonesty on the stand shifts the burden of proof to the defendant. 
C.  Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 
The burden of proof in a criminal case is supposed to be a heavy one for the 
government to meet.  The Supreme Court of the United States has expressed this 
sentiment many times, and has never strayed from it.29  For example, in 1979, the 
Court held:  “[B]y impressing upon the factfinder the need to reach a subjective state 
of near certitude of the guilt of the accused, the standard symbolizes the significance 
that our society attaches to the criminal sanction and thus to liberty itself.”30  In fact, 
a unanimous Supreme Court held in 1993 that a constitutionally deficient instruction 
on the meaning of reasonable doubt cannot be subjected to harmless error analysis.31   
The expression “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” is means for accomplishing an 
end – the requirement that a person should not be convicted unless the government 
proves its case to “near certitude.” 
For a reasonable doubt instruction to meet our first two criteria, it must be both 
comprehensible and written in language that is reasonably likely to accomplish its 
intended goal of informing the jury that it should convict only if it is nearly certain of 
the defendant’s guilt.  Incomprehensible statements, such as Ohio’s earlier 
presumption of innocence instruction, cannot possibly convey to a jury how it should 
deliberate.   
In addition, language that purports to place the burden on the government, but 
which then cleverly suggests that the burden rests with the defendant, should not be 
                                                                
29I discuss this history in some detail in Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of 
Proof in Criminal Cases: Some Doubt About reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX. L. REV.105, 109-12 
(1999). 
30Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979). 
31Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993). 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001
474 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:465 
acceptable.  Similarly, instructions that focus first on the difficulty of proving guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt, but then go on at great length about how most doubts are 
unreasonable, may undermine the very values that they purport to promote.  
Let us compare three sets of reasonable doubt instructions to see how well they 
achieve the criteria I have just enumerated.  The first is the instruction statutorily in 
place in 1954 in Ohio.  The second is Ohio’s current reasonable doubt instruction 
and the third is an instruction I believe sets the standard for burden of proof 
instructions.  It is New Jersey’s revision of an instruction promulgated by the Federal 
Judicial Center, which is superior to the others in meeting the three criteria.32 
The instruction used in the Sheppard trial began with the judge saying that the 
presumption of innocence requires “in the case of a charge of a crime, to be guilty of 
it by evidence showing it beyond a reasonable doubt as that term is understood under 
our law.”33  It then explains that the legislature has defined “reasonable doubt,” and 
conveys the statutory definition to the jury. When Dr. Sheppard was tried in 1954, 
Ohio defined “reasonable doubt” in its legislatively-drafted jury instruction as 
follows: 
It is not a mere possible doubt, because everything relating to human 
affairs or depending upon moral evidence is open to some possible or 
imaginary doubt.  It is that state of the case which, after the entire 
comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the 
jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding 
conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge.34 
This instruction, as short as it is, is riddled with problems.  First, it is not the case 
that the law requires “evidence showing” a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  It 
requires that the elements of a crime be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  Very 
strong evidence “showing” the crime may be neutralized by even stronger conflicting 
evidence.  Thus the instruction is unfaithful to the law, failing the first criterion of a 
good jury instruction.  The instruction also uses expressions that are unfamiliar in 
everyday speech (“moral evidence”), it focuses on which doubts are illegitimate 
ones, and defines “reasonable doubt” with a series of negatives that is very confusing 
and difficult to process.   
If in response to this instruction one asked, “what must the government do to 
prove its case,” it would be very hard to answer.  The response would have to be 
something like: “The government must prove its case by evidence beyond leaving 
you in the condition that you cannot say you feel an abiding conviction to a moral 
certainty of the truth of the charge.”  Yet the instruction never even does that much.  
It leaves it to the jurors to compute the relationship between the burden placed on the 
government and the definition of “reasonable doubt.”  In Part III of this article, I will 
discuss empirical studies suggesting that instructions that focus on what makes a 
doubt reasonable instead of what burden the government must meet serves to shift 
the burden of proof from the government to the defendant, and thus to undermine the 
presumption of innocence. 
                                                                
32FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 21 at 28 (1987 
ed.). 
33Transcript, supra note 13, at 6995. 
34OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.05. 
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The current statutory Ohio instruction, enacted by the Legislature in 1974, reads: 
“Reasonable doubt” is present when the jurors, after they have carefully 
considered and compared all the evidence, cannot say they are firmly 
convinced of the truth of the charge. It is a doubt based on reason and 
common sense. Reasonable doubt is not mere possible doubt, because 
everything relating to human affairs or depending on moral evidence is 
open to some possible or imaginary doubt. “Proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt” is proof of such character that an ordinary person would be willing 
to rely and act upon it in the most important of his own affairs.35 
Standard jury instructions stray from this language a bit, but capture its essence.36 
While the newer instruction is an improvement, problems remain.  The biggest 
problem with the current instruction is that it has failed to fix the major problem with 
the old one: its focus is on which doubts are reasonable, instead of on what the 
government’s burden should be. Again, it warns jurors against “possible doubt,” 
deals in negatives, and uses expressions with which jurors are unlikely to be familiar.  
For example, it continues to use the expression “moral evidence,” which comes from 
Enlightenment philosophy, and means, essentially, indirect evidence, as contrasted 
with “demonstrative evidence,” which is perceived directly through the senses.37  
The expression, “moral certainty,” present in the earlier Ohio instruction, means 
something like, “as certain as you can be given that you have to rely on moral 
evidence.”  Justice O’Connor has characterized the standard as meaning, “the highest 
degree of certitude based on such evidence.”38  The question is whether the 
expression “moral evidence” expresses this concept clearly to the jury.  
Let us compare these two instructions with a third: The Supreme Court of New 
Jersey’s slight revision of an instruction written in the 1980s by the Federal Judicial 
Center.  That instruction reads as follows: 
The government has the burden of proving the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Some of you may have served as jurors in 
civil cases, where you were told that it is necessary to prove only that a 
fact is more likely true than not true. In criminal cases, the government’s 
proof must be more powerful than that. It must be beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  
A reasonable doubt is an honest and reasonable uncertainty in your 
minds about the guilt of the defendant, after you have given full and 
impartial consideration to all of the evidence. A reasonable doubt may 
arise from the evidence itself or from a lack of evidence. It is a doubt that 
a reasonable person hearing the same evidence would harbor. 
                                                                
35OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.05(D) (West 2001). 
36Basically, the standard instruction replaces “the jury” with “you,” which serves to make 
the instructions easier to understand.  OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 403.50 at 36 (2000). 
37See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 11 (1994), for discussion of some of this history.  
For more detail, see Solan, supra note 29, and references cited therein. 
38511 U.S. at 11. 
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Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof, for example, that leaves you 
firmly convinced of the defendant’s guilt. In this world, we know very 
few things with absolute certainty. In criminal cases the law does not 
require proof that overcomes every possible doubt. If, based on your 
consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the defendant 
is guilty of the crime charged, you must find him guilty. If, on the other 
hand, you are not firmly convinced of defendant’s guilt, you must give 
defendant the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty.39 
The key to this instruction is its associating the expression “firmly convinced” 
with “proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”  It focuses the jury on the government’s 
burden, and not on what might be deficient about the defendant’s case.  Before 
exploring why this instruction is so much superior to the others, however, let us turn 
to the instruction on circumstantial evidence in the Sheppard trial, which suffered 
from some of the same problems, among others. 
D.  Circumstantial Evidence: The Judge and the Cherry Tree 
The instruction in the 1954 Sheppard trial on the nature of circumstantial 
evidence is also problematic.  It was a ground for appeal, rejected by the Ohio 
appellate courts,40 but focused upon heavily in Justice Taft’s dissenting opinion in 
the Supreme Court of Ohio’s affirmance of Dr. Sheppard’s conviction.41  It began 
with a description of the difference between direct and circumstantial evidence.  It 
then told the jury to do the following: 
It is necessary that you keep in mind, and you are so instructed, that where 
circumstantial evidence is adduced it, together with all other evidence, 
must convince you on the issue involved beyond a reasonable doubt and 
that where circumstantial evidence alone is relied upon in the proof of any 
element essential to a finding of guilt such evidence, together with any 
and all other evidence in the case, and with all the facts and 
circumstances of the case as found by you must be such as to convince 
you beyond a reasonable doubt and be consistent only  with the theory of 
guilt and inconsistent with any theory of innocence. If evidence is equally 
consistent with the theory of innocence as it is with the theory of guilt it is 
to be resolved in favor of the theory of innocence.42 
On one reading, the last two sentences are inconsistent.  The first tells the jurors that 
circumstantial evidence must “be consistent only with the theory of guilt and 
inconsistent with any theory of innocence.”  The second says that the burden of proof 
should act as a tie-breaker.  If the evidence favors the two parties equally, then the 
jury should acquit.  Note that the last sentence really describes proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence, and is remote from any legitimate concept of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
                                                                
39State v. Medina,   685 A.2d 1242, 1251-52 (N.J. 1996). 
40Ohio v. Sheppard, 135 N.E.2d 340 (Ohio 1956); Ohio v. Sheppard, 128 N.E.2d 504 
(Ohio App. 1955). 
41Sheppard, 135 N.E.2d at 351 (Taft, J., dissenting). 
42Id. at 346 (emphasis added). 
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It is also possible to argue that these sentences should not be read separately, but 
should be taken as a whole, and that together they convey the message that 
circumstantial evidence must be especially strong for a conviction to be based on it.  
The first sentence conveys the rule, and the second emphasizes that ties go to the 
defendant.  That might be true—but it might not be.  There is absolutely no reason to 
believe that jurors will focus on the first of two inconsistent statements.  In fact, there 
is reason to believe the opposite.  Note that the first statement entails the second, 
making it logically nothing more than surplusage.  If, indeed, it is the case that all 
uncertainties in circumstantial evidence are to be resolved in favor of the defendant, 
then it also must be true that uncertainties when the evidence is equally consistent 
with guilt and innocence are to be resolved in favor of the defendant.  The juror 
hearing these sentences, then, will ask herself why the judge bothered to utter the 
second sentence.  
In everyday life, we answer such questions to ourselves by applying what the 
philosopher H. Paul Grice called principles of conversational implicature.43  When 
listening, we make assumptions about what the speaker is trying to communicate, 
and when speaking we make assumptions about how the listener is likely to 
understand what we are saying.  Given that language permits a vast range of 
inferences, successful communication requires that the speaker and listener both be 
on more or less the same wavelength with respect to these goals.  According to 
Grice, the dominant inference that people use is a cooperative principle: “Make your 
conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the 
accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.”44  
Grice describes certain maxims that follow from this principle.  Among them are the 
maxim of quantity (“make your contribution as informative as is required (for the 
current purposes of the exchange”)), and the maxim of relevance (“be relevant.”).45  
Returning to the Sheppard case, consider the reasoning that a juror is likely 
engage in after hearing the potentially conflicting instructions.  The maxim of 
quantity suggests to the juror that the second part of the instruction – the part that 
imposes only a preponderance of the evidence standard – is not mere surplusage.  
Taking the two statements together, the juror might sensibly conclude that close 
cases should be resolved in favor of acquittal, but that once the case was pretty 
strong, it was fair enough to draw inferences in favor of the state.  This is a far cry 
from any acceptable notion of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The most dramatic part of the instruction came when the judge illustrated the 
difference between direct and circumstantial evidence, a common practice among 
courts.46  Significantly, in affirming Dr. Sheppard’s conviction, the majority opinion 
                                                                
43Paul H. Grice, Logic and Conversation, in SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS, VOL. 3: SPEECH 
ACTS 41 (P. Cole & J. Morgan eds., 1975). 
44Id. at 45. 
45Id. at 45-46. 
46The following was the practice at that time: 
In defining circumstantial evidence, it is proper to use illustrations drawn from 
common experience or based upon familiar events of every-day life.  Illustrations 
which are apt and clear, and not of such a character as to cause the jury to lose sight of 
the real issue, are often helpful in making clear a legal proposition otherwise difficult 
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of the Supreme Court of Ohio did not mention this part of the circumstantial 
evidence instruction – the part that is routinely mentioned in the popular literature on 
the Sheppard case.  For that, we need to read the dissent.  The trial judge illustrated 
the difference between direct and circumstantial evidence with the following 
example: 
Illustrating now what would be direct evidence, let us assume that I had 
on a certain day a very fine cherry tree in my yard.  The family happens to 
be away on that day and when I return about five o’clock in the evening I 
find my cherry tree chopped down.  I proceed to investigate and first make 
inquiry of my next door neighbor Mr. Smith.  I ask him if he saw any 
stranger doing anything in my yard on that day.  He replies: ‘Yes, I saw 
George Washington chop it down with an ax.’ That would constitute 
direct evidence because Mr. Smith is relying on his own sense of sight 
and states what he himself saw with his own eyes.  For that reason he is 
able to give direct evidence that George Washington chopped down that 
cherry tree. 
Let us now consider a case of circumstantial evidence in the same 
connection.  Assume that on inquiry of Mr. Smith, my neighbor, he, in 
answer to my question, says that he did not see anyone chopping down 
my tree. I then ask him: ‘Did you see anyone about my place today.’ He 
replies: ‘Yes, I saw George Washington walk along your driveway from 
the yard to the street with an ax on his shoulder.’ Here is evidence of a 
fact which does not directly prove who chopped down my cherry tree but 
which permits a natural and fair inference that George Washington was in 
my yard with an ax combined with the fact that my tree was chopped 
down would constitute very definitely a piece of circumstantial evidence 
to be weighed in the consideration of a charge against George involving 
the act of chopping down that tree.47 
Justice Taft’s dissenting opinion recognized the problem with the instruction and 
described it well: 
This portion of the court’s charge was most unfortunate in the instant case 
and quite probably had a tendency to mislead the jury.  The state was 
contending that defendant’s guilt should be inferred largely from the 
circumstance of his presence in the house at the time of the killing.  The 
jury was told in effect that George Washington could be found guilty of 
chopping down the tree because he was seen nearby with an ax in his 
possession; and the jury would thus be influenced by this example to 
conclude that, since defendant was nearby at the time of the killing and 
“could have” committed the crime even though the nature of the murder 
weapon was never identified by any evidence, then defendant, like George 
                                                          
of comprehension, and tend to overcome a layman’s conception that conviction upon 
circumstantial evidence is wrong. 
LEHR FESS, 3 OHIO INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES § 8.15 (1953).  
47Sheppard, 135 N.E.2d at 351-52 (Taft, J. dissenting). 
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Washington, did what was consistent with the circumstance of his 
presence.  This is especially likely to have improperly influenced the jury, 
since everyone has been taught that George Washington did do what was 
consistent with the circumstance of his presence, that is, chopped down 
the cherry tree. 48 
The dissenting opinion demonstrates an intuitive sense that jurors reason in terms of 
the  mental models they form.  The cherry tree story was designed to raise a 
comparison between Dr. Sheppard – who seemed to be guilty because he was present 
but would not admit it – and George Washington – who seemed guilty because he 
was present, but was willing in advance to accept punishment because he could not 
tell a lie.  If George Washington would have been honest enough to accept his 
punishment, how could the jurors let Sam Sheppard off in such similar 
circumstances?   
To see how bad the instruction was, consider this alternative.  An important piece 
of circumstantial evidence on which the defense relied was the absence of splattered 
blood on Dr. Sheppeard’s pants.  Suppose the judge had given this example: 
Suppose I am trying to find out whether my young child, George, has 
eaten the last cookie from the cookie jar.  I know that he always ends up 
with chocolate all over his face, hands and clothing after eating cookies.  
He especially gets chocolate on his pants from wiping his hands on them.  
When I look at George, there is no chocolate on his pants, however.  I can 
infer from the absence of chocolate on his pants that he is not the one who 
ate the cookie. 
Of course, the prosecutor would have objected to any such instruction, and with good 
reason.  But the instruction actually given to the jury was no less heavy-handed.  In 
suggesting that jurors draw inferences of guilt from equivocal facts, it violated both 
the criterion of fidelity to the law and the criterion of consistency with the 
presumption of innocence.   
These problems are not trivial.  By all accounts,49 the case against Sheppard was 
entirely circumstantial.  He was in the house when his wife was killed.  He claimed 
to have been assaulted by someone who tore off his (i.e., Dr. Sheppard’s) shirt in a 
struggle at the beach behind the house.  Where is that person?  What happened to the 
shirt?  Did Dr. Sheppard remove it because it contained his wife’s blood?  Much of 
the defense was circumstantial as well.  If Sheppard killed his wife, why was there 
no blood splattered on his pants?  What motive did he have?  And so on.  How the 
jury regarded the circumstantial evidence was of critical importance. 
Note that the court could have used a neutral illustration.  In many states, courts 
talk about rain.  Below is a typical example: 
Circumstantial evidence is simply a chain of circumstances that indirectly 
proves a fact. If someone walked into the courtroom wearing a raincoat 
covered with drops of water and carrying a wet umbrella, that would be 
                                                                
48Id. at 351. 
49There are indeed many, but all agree that the case against Dr. Sheppard was 
circumstantial.  See Jack Harrison Pollack, DR SAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY (1972); HOLMES, 
supra note 7; NEFF, supra note 2. 
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circumstantial evidence from which you could conclude that it was 
raining.50  
Of course, the problem with this kind of instruction is that it has doomed itself to 
irrelevance for the sake of neutrality.51 
The question of how to present the notion of circumstantial evidence to a jury is 
very much a matter of disagreement within the judicial system today.  Some states, 
including Ohio, have eliminated any legal consequences of the distinction between 
direct and circumstantial evidence.  In 1991, the Supreme Court of Ohio held in  
Ohio v. Jenks: 
In every criminal case, the jury is asked to weigh all of the admissible 
evidence, both circumstantial and direct, to determine if the defendant is 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, there is but one standard of 
proof in a criminal case, and that is proof of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. This tenet of the criminal law remains true, whether the evidence 
against a defendant is circumstantial or direct.  We therefore hold that 
where the state relies on circumstantial evidence to prove an element of 
the offense, and where the jury is properly instructed on the standards for 
reasonable doubt, an additional instruction on circumstantial evidence is 
not required.  Once the jury is properly instructed as to the heavy burden 
the state bears under the “guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, the 
jury is then free to choose between competing constructions of the 
evidence.52 
On the other hand, some courts still instruct on circumstantial evidence, and it is 
not unusual to find courts weighing the risk of undermining the presumption of 
innocence against the futility of providing examples that are so far removed from the 
facts of the case to make the instructions useless.  For example, the Second Circuit 
has reversed a conviction based in part on a circumstantial evidence instruction that 
contained an example presuming the defendant’s guilt.53  To the best of my 
knowledge, empirical studies have not addressed this important issue. 
III.  SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
In this section, I will discuss burden of proof instructions in light of several 
important advances in our knowledge of language and cognitive psychology over the 
past quarter century.  Instructions such as the one used in the Sheppard trial are 
especially likely to shift the burden of proof when the government bases its case on 
circumstantial evidence and the defendant cannot come up with a convincing 
alternative scenario.   
                                                                
50Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro 894 F. Supp. 619, 830 (D.Del. 1995). 
51Courts have noted this shortcoming.  See United States v. Gleason, 616 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 
1979). 
52574 N.E.2d 492, 503 (Ohio 1991). 
53United States v. Dove, 916 F.2d 41,46 (2d Cir. 1990). 
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A.  Proof vs. Reasonable Doubt 
First, let us look closely at the expression, “proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
The phrase has two parts: proof, and reasonable doubt.  The problem is that it fails to 
say how much proof the government must submit in the first place before reasonable 
doubt even becomes relevant.  The very expression invites jurors to determine first 
that the government has put on a case, and then to determine whether the defense has 
been able to “raise” reasonable doubts.54  But the defendant is not supposed to be 
required to raise anything.  That is the essence of the presumption of innocence.  The 
result of focusing the jury on the notion of reasonable doubt is that once the 
government puts on a case, even a weak one, it appears to be up to the defendant to 
rebut it.  
Psychologists over the past two decades have suggested that people think of 
events in terms of mental models that they form and revise as new facts come to 
light.55  Jury theorists, such as Reid Hastie and his colleagues, have similarly 
proposed that jurors evaluate a case in light of competing stories that they weigh 
against each other.56  Standard reasonable doubt instructions play into this 
psychology by encouraging jurors to lose focus on the strength of the government’s 
case, and instead to compare one story against the other. 
Moreover, experienced trial lawyers know that it is easier to win a case by 
presenting the jury with an alternative theory of the facts than by merely attacking 
the strength of the prosecution’s case.  Certainly F. Lee Bailey knew it in the retrial 
of the Sheppard case.  He made sure that he presented evidence consistent with an 
intruder having been in the house.  An expert testified that some of the blood on the 
wall was that of the intruder.  It worked.  Jurors from the second trial that James Neff 
interviewed remembered being impressed by this evidence.57  The value of 
presenting alternative theories is that it gives jurors alternative mental models into 
which to construct the story of the case.   
Earlier I suggested that the New Jersey modification of the Federal Judicial 
Center’s reasonable doubt instruction goes a long way toward curing the ills of most 
standard instructions.58  What makes the New Jersey instruction better than the others 
is that it does not define “reasonable doubt.”  Instead, it defines “proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt,” focusing the jury on the government’s burden, not on a phantom 
obligation of the defendant to raise doubts.  It says that such proof must leave jurors 
“firmly convinced” of the defendant’s guilt.  Moreover, the expression “firmly 
convinced,” seems to capture well the notion that the government must put on a 
strong case.  We are convinced when the evidence in favor of a proposition is strong, 
and the alternatives are weak. 
Both the old and new Ohio instructions, in contrast, begin with definitions of 
doubt.  The older instruction actually begins by saying what should not count as a 
                                                                
54For detailed discussion of these points, see Solan, supra note 29. 
55See PHILIP N. JOHNSON-LAIRD, MENTAL MODELS (1983). 
56See REID HASTIE, STEVEN D. PENROD & NANCY PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 15-36 
(1983). 
57NEFF, supra note 2, at 281. 
58See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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doubt, which adds additional interpretive difficulties to which I will return.  The 
current Ohio instruction uses “firmly convinced” as do the New Jersey and Federal 
Judicial Center instructions.  However, the Ohio version uses it as a partial definition 
of doubt, rather than as an explanation of how strong the government’s proof must 
be.  Moreover, because of this, the drafters were forced to use “firmly convinced” in 
the negative, adding to the instruction’s complexity.  To understand the logic of the 
instruction, a juror must substitute the definition of reasonable doubt into the 
expression, “proof beyond a reasonable doubt,” more or less as follows: 
The government must prove its case beyond the point at which, after you 
have carefully considered and compared all the evidence, you cannot say 
you are firmly convinced of the truth of the charge. 
Compare that to the New Jersey version: 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof, for example, that leaves you 
firmly convinced of the defendant’s guilt. 
The expression “beyond” contains an implied negative.  Thus, it is necessary to sort 
through double negatives to understand the Ohio version.  A number of researchers 
have shown how rewriting jury instructions to eliminate just this sort of confusion, 
can enhance comprehensibility enormously.59 
In fairness, the new Ohio instruction, after defining reasonable doubt negatively 
in terms of not firmly convincing the jury, does attempt to address the strength of the 
government’s case. But it does so with an expression, often used in burden of proof 
instructions, that necessarily conveys mixed signals: 
“Proof beyond a reasonable doubt” is proof of such character that an 
ordinary person would be willing to rely and act upon it in the most 
important of his own affairs. 
This instruction accomplishes its goal only if ordinary people must reach a state of 
“near certitude” before they make important decisions in their own lives.  In my own 
life, I set no such standard.  I do what I can to make whatever decisions I think are 
best, given the information that I have.  Often enough, I feel that I’m muddling 
along, lucky to be doing as well as I am.  I would not be surprised if most people feel 
just that way with respect to important personal decisions that they must make. 
A considerable empirical literature suggests that this burden-shifting perspective 
captures the way jurors approach their task.  While I will not summarize it in detail 
here,60 I will describe two of the more dramatic studies briefly.  First, Irwin 
Horowitz, a psychologist, and Laird Kirkpatrick, an evidence scholar, have 
conducted an important study in which they presented potential jurors in Oregon 
with tapes of mini-trials.61  Half of the subjects watched a “strong case” for the 
prosecution, in which 85% of the evidence was judged in advance to favor 
conviction.  The other half watched a “weak case,” in which the evidence was 
                                                                
59See supra note 20. 
60See Solan, supra note 29, for detailed discussion of most of this literature. 
61Irwin A. Horowitz & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, A Concept in Search of a Definition: The 
Effects of Reasonable Doubt Instructions on Certainty of Guilt Standards and Jury Verdicts, 
20 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 655 (1996). 
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equally divided between the two sides.  After watching the trial and answering some 
preliminary questions, subjects were divided into six-person juries.  Each jury heard 
one of the following five definitions of reasonable doubt:  (1) moral certainty; (2) 
does not cause you to waver and vacillate; (3) real doubt; (4) reasonable doubt 
undefined; and (5) firmly convinced, the Federal Judicial Center’s instruction.   The 
results are telling.  Only the “firmly convinced” instruction achieved acquittals when 
the case was weak, and convictions when the case was strong.  All of the other 
instructions resulted in at least a 50% conviction rate for the weak case, and a high 
conviction rate when the case was strong.  
Horowitz and Kirkpatrick’s study is consistent with the point I am making here.  
I certainly do not argue that the best burden of proof instruction is the one that will 
always lead jurors to acquit.  Rather, the best instruction is the one that will generally 
lead the jury to convict when the government’s case is strong, and not otherwise.  I 
hope to have provided an underlying explanation for these experimental results. 
The second study was conducted in Wyoming by Bradley Saxton, and involved 
interviews with actual jurors who had just completed a criminal case.62  Jurors were 
asked whether they agreed or disagreed with certain characterizations of the trial 
process.  One question was the following: 
According to the instructions the judge gave you, is the following 
statement true or false: In a criminal trial, the state is responsible for 
producing evidence for the jury that tends to show that the defendant may 
have committed the crime – once the state has made this showing, it is the 
defendant’s responsibility to produce witnesses or other evidence to 
persuade the jury that the defendant did not commit the crime.63 
Jurors could respond with, “I’m very sure that this statement is true,” “I’m pretty 
sure that this statement is true,” “I don’t know,” “I’m pretty sure that this statement 
is false,” or “I’m very sure that this statement is false.”  Thirty-one percent of the 
jurors were either very sure or pretty sure that the quoted statement is true.  That is, 
almost one-third of the jurors who actually sat on a criminal case left believing that 
the burden of proof shifted to the defendant once the government had adduced 
evidence of guilt. 
Wyoming’s reasonable doubt instruction does not define the term.  Thus, the 
results of this study suggest that the expression “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” 
and the way people model their thinking in general, contributed to this result.  No 
doubt other instructions can either enhance or diminish the extent to which jurors 
believe that the burden shifts to the defendant.  The analysis I have presented, 
combined with the results of Horowitz and Kirkpatrick, suggest that keeping the jury 
focused on the fact that the government has the burden of presenting proof that 
leaves the juror firmly convinced of the defendant’s guilt is an effective way of 
reducing the extent to which jurors shift the burden of proof. 
As for shifting burdens, Dr. Sheppard’s conviction provides a tragic example of 
this dynamic.  But it happens in less celebrated cases as well.  In the everyday 
practice of criminal law, it is most likely to occur when, say, a person with a criminal 
                                                                
62Bradley Saxton, How Well do Jurors Understand Jury Instructions? A Field Test Using 
Real Juries and Real Trials in Wyoming, 33LAND & WATER L. REV. 59 (1998). 
63Id. at 141 question 21. 
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record is arrested for holding up a store.  The defendant was, indeed, nearby, but 
didn’t commit the crime.  He has a lawyer, but the lawyer is too burdened to 
investigate the case aggressively, and the defendant can not, as a practical matter, 
testify, because his prior convictions that will come out only if he is a witness.64  The 
result is that he will be unable to raise reasonable doubt, and therefore is likely to 
lose the case despite the proof not being very strong. 
B.  Some Troubling Definitions of Doubt 
A second set of problems with many reasonable doubt instructions, including 
Ohio’s, concerns the substance of the definitions of “doubt.”  While I have focused 
thus far on ways in which standard reasonable doubt instructions tend to shift the 
burden of proof away from the government in criminal cases, the concept has 
another effect, which is sometimes of help to defendants, especially defendants of 
means who are well-represented by counsel.  Defense lawyers can accept the 
challenge of raising reasonable doubt by concocting scenarios consistent with the 
evidence that are logically possible, but far-fetched.  They can then argue to the jury 
that their client is innocent because they have been able to establish reasonable 
doubt.  Many people see the O.J. Simpson case as an example of this tactic. 
Of course, this approach to defending criminal defendants is no secret to 
prosecutors, judges, legislators or state commissions who write and revise pattern 
jury instructions.  The result has been a backlash.  Many instructions spend a great 
deal of time explaining to jurors what should not count as a reasonable doubt, and 
making sure that jurors do not take the concept of reasonable doubt too far.  The 
reaction is entirely understandable.  But its cost is that it adds to the burden that a 
defendant must meet when the government has a fairly weak case based on 
circumstantial evidence, and the defendant does not have any good alternative 
explanations of what happened because he wasn’t there and didn’t commit the crime.  
Let us look at what we really do when we doubt, and then compare this 
understanding to what jury instructions say about it.  Doubting is an imaginative 
process.  When someone says, “I doubt that the Yankees will win yet another World 
Series this year,” what is that person saying?  He is saying that he can imagine a 
possible world in which the Yankees do win, but that he does not believe that the real 
world next October will coincide with the world that he has imagined now.  
Philosophers of language use the notion of “possible world” to describe the 
semantics of statements about the future, about counterfactuals, and about states of 
mind, among other things.65 
With this in mind, let us look once again at the older Ohio instruction, which was 
in place during the Sheppard trial in 1954.  It begins its definition of reasonable 
doubt: 
It is not a mere possible doubt, because everything relating to human 
affairs or depending upon moral evidence is open to some possible or 
imaginary doubt.   
                                                                
64See F. R. EVID. 609 (permitting impeachment of a witness’s credibility by evidence of 
conviction of a crime). 
65For a good description of this perspective, consistent with the psychology of mental 
models, see JOHNSON-LAIRD, supra note 55, at 56-63. 
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Although the drafter may not have intended to bias the instruction so heavily in favor 
of the government, this instruction tells jurors not to pay attention to any doubts.  For 
all doubts are only possible doubts, based on imagination.  That is precisely how we 
doubt. 
The statutory definition then ended on a positive note: 
It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and 
consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that 
condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction to a moral 
certainty of the truth of the charge. 
This must mean that the government has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt 
when the evidence does not leave the minds of the jurors in the condition that they 
cannot say they feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the 
charge.  Putting aside whether the average juror understands what all the words 
mean, it is almost inconceivable that he can parse his way through this sentence and 
get the logical relations right.  Moreover, the approved instructions then in force 
went way beyond the statutory language to list a host of things that are not doubt and 
others that are.66 
While the Ohio reasonable doubt instruction in force since 1974 is a major 
improvement, some of its language is the same as the early version.  The instruction 
now says: 
It is a doubt based on reason and common sense. Reasonable doubt is not 
mere possible doubt, because everything relating to human affairs or 
depending on moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary 
doubt. 
This is practically identical to the language that I earlier criticized.  In contrast, the 
Federal Judicial Center instruction, as modified by the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey, contains very little such language even though it conveys the notion that 
nothing is certain in this world. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The questions that I have tried to raise in this paper focus on what we have 
learned in the almost fifty years since Dr. Sheppard’s conviction.  When it comes to 
the study of psychology and language, the answer seems to be that we’ve learned a 
great deal.  But only some of that learning has made its way into the law.  Ohio’s 
current presumption of innocence instruction is now a clear and accurate reflection 
of the law.  Its reasonable doubt instructions are better than those under which Dr. 
Sheppard was convicted, but still leave room for improvement, given what we now 
know about how people construe language and what the effects of using different 
instructions really are.  Significantly, Ohio’s reasonable doubt instruction is by no 
means unusual.  A number of states and federal circuits can and should improve their 
instructions to catch up with what we know about how jurors understand 
instructions.   
                                                                
66FESS, supra note 46, at § 86.13 (listing, among other things:  “It is not a mere capricious 
or speculative doubt; it is not a doubt voluntarily excited in the mind, in order to avoid the 
rendition of a disagreeable verdict”). 
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Finally, while changes in the substantive law have taken care of the horrible 
instructions on circumstantial evidence in Dr. Sheppard’s first trial, the legal system 
is still uncertain about how to discuss this concept.  If no examples are given, the 
concepts seem rather abstract.  If a neutral example is given, it may not seem 
relevant.  But if a relevant example is given, then it may tend to undermine the 
presumption of innocence.   
I have presented three rather simple criteria for evaluating criminal jury 
instructions: fidelity to the law; comprehensibility; and consistency with the 
presumption of innocence.  We have seen some improvement in the half century 
since Dr. Sheppard’s conviction.  But anyone reading through the standard jury 
instructions of most jurisdictions will have to conclude quickly that many 
instructions fail to meet one or more of the criteria for good instructions.  It should 
not take fifty more years for jury commissions, legislatures and appellate courts to 
focus their attention on completing the task. 
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